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Abstract
There are many familiar situations in which a manager seeks to design a system in which users share
a resource, but outcomes depend on the information held and actions taken by users. If communication is
possible, the manager can ask users to report their private information and then, using this information,
instruct them on what actions they should take. If the users are compliant, this reduces the manager’s
optimization problem to a well-studied problem of optimal control. However, if the users are self-interested
and not compliant, the problem is much more complicated: when asked to report their private information,
the users might lie; upon receiving instructions, the users might disobey. Here we ask whether the manager
can design the system to get around both of these difficulties. To do so, the manager must provide for the
users the incentives to report truthfully and to follow the instructions, despite the fact that the users are self-
interested. For a class of environments that includes many resource allocation games in communication
networks, we provide tools for the manager to design an efficient system. In addition to reports and
recommendations, the design we employ allows the manager to intervene in the system after the users
take actions. In an abstracted environment, we find conditions under which the manager can achieve the
same outcome it could if users were compliant, and conditions under which it does not. We then apply
our framework and results to design a flow control management system.
Index Terms
Game Theory, Mechanism Design, Intervention, Resource Allocation, Flow Control
2I. INTRODUCTION
There are many situations in which a manager seeks to design a system for users to share a
resource, optimizing it according to some given benevolent or selfish criterion. If the manager has
full information and users cannot act independently of the manager, the manager’s problem is one
of optimal control and is well-studied. If the users have information the manager does not have
and act independently of the manager, but communication between the users and the manager is
possible and users are compliant, the manager’s problem is only slightly more complicated: the
manager can simply ask the users to report their private information and then provide instructions
on how it wishes them to behave. Because the users are compliant, they will report truthfully and
obey instructions, so, whatever the manager’s objective, this again reduces to a known problem
in optimal control. However, if the users are self-interested and strategic, two difficulties arise.
The first is that the users might lie about their private information – if it is in their individual
interests to do so; the second is that the users might disobey the instructions of the manager –
if it is in their individual interests to do so. The manager’s problem in this setting is to design
a system to maximize its objective function, given the self-interested and strategic nature of the
users. A case of particular interest is that of a benevolent manager, who seeks to allocate resources
efficiently or fairly according to some measure of social welfare. Efficient resource allocation is
crucial to make the system accessible to many users and provide each of them with good service.
However, the problem faced by a benevolent manager may be no easier than the problem faced
by a selfish manager, who maximizes some measure of its own personal welfare, because the
strategic interests of the individual users will be different from the interests of the group of users
as a whole, and hence may still lead individual users to lie and to disobey.1
In the economics literature, such problems are formalized in terms of mechanism design [11]–
[16]. The usual approach is to design a system in which the users make reports to the manager
on the basis of their private information, the manager provides instructions to the users based on
these reports, and the users then take actions that maximize their own welfare. A version of the
revelation principle [16] implies that such systems can always be designed so that the users find
1Even in the absence of private information, the strategic interests of the individual users usually lead to the over-use of resources
and to substantial inefficiencies [1], [2].
3it in their own self-interest to report truthfully and act obediently. We merge such an approach
with the innovation introduced by [17], and applied to situations of medium access control [5],
[18], and power control [4], by allowing for intervention by the manager.2 That is, we allow the
manager, in addition to designing a system of reports and instructions, to deploy an intervention
device that intervenes after the users take actions. The action of this intervention device depends
on the reports and the actions of the users, and it follows an intervention rule designed by the
manager. The intervention device adds to the manager’s ability to provide incentives for the users
to report truthfully and obey instructions by threatening punishments if users lie and/or disobey.
In this paper we explore the manager’s problem in a class of abstract environments that exhibit
some features common to many resource sharing situations in communication networks, including
power control [3], [4], medium access control (MAC), [5], [6], and flow control [6]–[10]. We will
characterize a coordination mechanism, i.e., a system of reports, recommendation and intervention,
that is optimal (from the point of view of the manager) among all mechanisms. We provide
conditions on the environment under which it is possible for the manager to achieve its benchmark
optimum – the outcome it could achieve if users were compliant – and conditions under which it
is impossible for the manager to achieve its benchmark optimum. Although we can characterize
the optimal mechanism, other mechanisms are also of interest, for several reasons. The optimal
mechanism may be very difficult to compute, and hence to execute. It is therefore of some
interest to consider mechanisms that are sub-optimal but easy to compute, and we provide a
simple algorithm that converges to such a mechanism. Moreover, in some situations, it may not be
possible for the users to communicate with the manager, so it is natural to consider intervention
schemes that do not require the users to make reports. Finally, we apply these results in the
context of flow control. Computations show, among other things, that the considered schemes can
considerably increase the efficiency of the system.
There is by now a substantial communication engineering literature that addresses the problem
of providing incentives for strategic users to obey a particular resource allocation scheme. Some of
this literature adopts pricing schemes that charge users for their resource usage. Pricing schemes
can be divided into two categories: pricing for strategic users [19]–[22] and pricing for distributed
2A packet-dropping scheme that follows the same philosophy as intervention was proposed for flow control games in [7].
4algorithms [3], [23], [24]. The former is used for scenarios where the users are self-interested
and strategic, as in our scenario. Such users are required to pay real money for their resource
usage. If the manager knows how a payment affects the utility of a user, it can give the incentives
to the user to adopt a particular resource allocation scheme by setting the right prices. Such
pricing schemes may achieve the goal of optimal levels of resource usage, but suffer from the
following drawbacks: (1) the users are forced, “by contract”, to pay depending on their resource
usage and on the state of the system3; (2) the manager has to know the users’ monetary valuation
for the service; (3) a secure infrastructure to collect the money is needed. Pricing for distributed
algorithms is used for scenarios where the users are compliant and game theory is used as a tool
to obtain an efficient distributed algorithm.4 In this case the users accept passively the utilities
imposed by the manager, that incorporate a term that represents a cost, even though the payments
do not actually need to be carried out. The distributed algorithm is obtained forcing the users
to act as selfish agents that maximize such utilities, using for example a best response dynamic.
Game theory allows to foresee the outcome of this interaction, and the manager has to design the
users’ utilities to obtain a desired outcome.
A different literature, including [4], [5], [17], [18], adopts the intervention schemes considered
here. Intervention differs from pricing5 in that it operates inside the system while pricing operates
outside the system: both schemes provide the manager with a tool to alter the utility of users,
but intervention affects resource usage – and hence utility – directly, while pricing affects utility
indirectly, through payments. Thus, intervention is more robust than pricing: users cannot evade
intervention but they might be able to evade monetary charges, moreover, the manager does not
need to know the users’ monetary valuation for the service in intervention schemes.
So far, both intervention and pricing schemes have mainly been applied in communication
engineering games with complete information, i.e., assuming that the manager knows the relevant
information held by the users. There are few works that address the problem of extracting the
3Current communication networks use different business models.
4This is not the scenario considered in this paper, but we want to complete the discussion on pricing schemes to remark that
they might be applied to two different scenarios and to avoid misunderstandings.
5Since in this paper we consider self-interested and strategic users, we implicitly refer to the first category of pricing schemes.
5Knowledge of users’ mone-
tary valuations for the service
Users’ behaviors in
reporting information
Users’ behaviors in
taking actions
This work (intervention +
mechanism design)
not needed
Truthful communication
enforced by intervention
Actions enforced by
intervention
Intervention not needed Compliant users
Actions enforced by
intervention
Pricing for strategic users needed Compliant users
Actions enforced by
payments \ contract
Pricing for distributed
algorithms
not needed Compliant users Compliant users
Conventional mechanism
design (e.g., auctions)
This is the information the
users are asked to report
Truthful communication
enforced by the scheme
Actions enforced by
payments \ contract
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT INCENTIVE SCHEMES EXPLOITED IN COMMUNICATION ENGINEERING LITERATURE.
relevant information from the users. Such works (e.g., [25]–[27]) apply the ideas of mechanism
design for auctions, creating schemes that ask the users to reveal their monetary valuation for the
service and, depending on it, to pay for their resource usage. These schemes suffer from the same
defects as the previously cited pricing schemes: the users are forced to pay depending on their
resource usage and a secure infrastructure to collect the money is needed. Table I summarizes
the main differences between the above described incentive schemes used in communication
engineering literature and our approach.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the coordination
mechanism model, using Myerson’s framework [16] as the reference. In Section III, we study the
properties of the optimal mechanism. In Section IV, we consider two suboptimal mechanisms
which, under some assumptions, are easier to compute with respect to the optimal mechanism. In
Section V, we analyze and we show the results for the flow control game, both in the complete
and incomplete information frameworks, and with and without intervention. Section VI concludes
with some remarks.
6II. A GENERALIZED COORDINATION MECHANISM FOR PRIVATE INFORMATION PROBLEMS
We consider a manager that wants to design a system whose resources will be used by n users,
N = {1, 2, ..., n} denoting the set of users. Each user might have private information that the
manager cannot observe and might take an action that the manager cannot directly control. We
denote by Ti = {τi,1, τi,2, ..., τi,mi} ⊂ R, mi ∈ N, the finite set of user i’s private information, in
which the elements are labeled in increasing order, i.e., τi,1 < τi,2 <, ..., < τi,mi . We denote by
Di = [d
min
i , d
max
i ] ⊂ R the set of user i’s possible actions. We refer to ti ∈ Ti and to di ∈ Di as
the type and the action of user i. As an example, each action di may represent user i’s level of
resource usage, while each type ti may represent i’s personal valuation for the resource. We denote
by D = ×j∈NDj and T = ×j∈NTj the set of joint action profiles and the set of joint type profiles,
i.e., all the possible combinations of users’ actions and users’ types; and by D−i = ×j∈N\{i}Dj
and T−i = ×j∈N\{i}Tj all the possible combinations of users’ actions and users’ types except for
user i. Thus, the symbols t ∈ T , d ∈ D, t−i ∈ T−i and d−i ∈ D−i represent vectors.
We assume that the manager can instruct a device, which we refer to as the intervention device,
that will interact with the users in the system. The aim of the manager is to design the intervention
device so that the outcome of the system maximizes the manager’s objective. The intervention
device has three features: 1) it can communicate with users; 2) it can monitor users’ actions; 3)
it can take an action of its own, which we interpret following [17] as an intervention. We define
the intervention rule f : D → D0 = [dmin0 , dmax0 ] as a function that maps an action profile to
an action of the intervention device, and we denote by F the finite set of intervention rules that
the intervention device can implement. For the moment (the role of the intervention device for
incomplete information scenarios will be clear in Section II-C), we assume that the intervention
device takes an action following the randomized intervention rule π designed by the manager, such
that π(f) ≥ 0 , ∀ f ∈ F , and
∑
f∈F π(f) = 1. The randomized intervention rule is communicated
to all users before they select their actions. After observing users’ actions d, the intervention
device picks an intervention rule f following the probability distribution π and intervenes with
an action f(d). We refer to the couple (D0,F) as the intervention capability. Finally, we denote
by U0 : F ×D × T → R the manager’s utility function, and by Ui : F × D × T → R user i’s
7utility function, where T = ×i∈NTi, Ti = [τi,1, τi,mi ].6
A. Assumptions on utilities
We assume that the manager’s utility satisfies the following assumptions, ∀d ∈ D and ∀t ∈ T ,
A1: There exists d∗0 ∈ D0 such that U0(d∗0, d, t) > U0(d0, d, t), ∀ d0 ∈ D0, d0 6= d∗0
A2: d∗(t) = argmaxd U0(d∗0, d, t) is unique
A3: d∗i (t) is differentiable with respect to ti and
∂d∗i (t)
∂ti
> 0
Assumption A1 states that d∗0 is the most preferred action of the manager, regardless of users’
actions and type profile. In games where the intervention device drives users’ actions by threatening
punishments, the intervention can be interpreted as the level of punishment and d∗0 as the absence
of intervention.
By assumption A2, for every type profile t ∈ T and for every user i ∈ N , the users’ joint
action profile that maximizes the intervention device’s utility is unique, and by assumption A3,
each component in d∗(t) is continuous and increasing in the type of that user. If actions represent
the level of resource usage and types represent resource valuations, assumption A3 asserts that
the higher i’s valuation the higher should be i’s level of resource usage.
For each type profile t ∈ T , we define the game
Γ0t = (N , D, {Ui(d
∗
0, ·, t)}
n
i=1) (1)
Γ0t is the complete information game (i.e., users know everything about the structure of the game,
in particular, they know the types of the other users) that models the interaction between strategic
users having types t when the intervention device adopts the action d∗0 independently of users’
actions. It can be thought as the complete information game that models users’ interaction in the
absence of an intervention device.
We denote by dNE0(t) =
(
dNE
0
1 (t), . . . , d
NE0
n (t)
)
a Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the game Γ0t ,
which is an action profile so that each user obtains its maximum utility given the actions of the
6We require the manager’s utility to be defined over the continuous interval T ⊂ Rn, that includes the finite type set T , because
the property A3 needs a set in which the differentiation operation is defined. However, the results in the rest of the paper are
obtained under the condition that each user i’s type belongs to the finite set Ti.
8other users, i.e.,
Ui
(
d∗0, d
NE0(t), t
)
≥ Ui
(
d∗0, di, d
NE0
−i (t), t
)
, ∀ di ∈ Di , ∀ i ∈ N (2)
Notice that we have a different game Γ0t , and therefore a different NE action profile, for each
possible type profile t ∈ T . For this reason dNE0(t) is represented as a function of t.
We assume that users’ utilities Ui(d∗0, d, t) are twice differentiable with respect to d and, ∀ d ∈ D,
∀ t ∈ T , ∀ i, j ∈ N , i 6= j,
A4: Ui(d∗0, d, t) is quasi-concave in di and there exists a unique best response function dBRi (d−i, t) =
argmaxdi Ui(d
∗
0, d, t)
A5: ∂
2Ui(d∗0 ,d,t)
∂di∂dj
≤ 0
A6: There exists dNE0(t) such that dNE0(t) ≥ d∗(t) 7 and dNE0k (τk, t−k) > d∗k(τk, t−k) for some
users k ∈ N and type τk ∈ Tk
Assumption A4 states that Γ0t is a quasi-concave game and the best response function dBRi (d−i, t)
that maximizes Ui(d∗0, d, t) is unique. Hence, either i’s utility is monotonic with respect to di, or
it increases with di until it reaches a maximum for dBRi (d−i, t), and decreases for higher values.
As a consequence, a NE dNE0(t) of Γ0t exists. In fact, the best response function dBR(d, t) =(
dBR1 (d−i, t), . . . , d
BR
n (d−i, t)
)
is a continuous function from the convex and compact set D to D
itself, therefore Brouwer’s fixed point theorem assures that a fixed point exists.
Assumption A5 asserts that Γ0t is a submodular game and it ensures that dBRi (d−i, t) is a non
increasing function of dj . Interpreting di as i’s level of resource usage, this situation reflects
resource allocation games where it is in the interest of a user not to increase its resource usage
if the total level of use of the other users increases, in order to avoid an excessive use of the
resource. Nevertheless, assumption A6 says that strategic users use the resources more heavily
compared to the optimal (from the manager’s point of view) usage level.
The class of games satisfying assumptions A4-A6 includes the linearly coupled games [6] and
many resource allocation games in communication networks, such as the MAC [5], [6], power
control [3], [4] and flow control [6]–[10] games. Moreover, if the manager’s utility is increasing
in the users’ utilities (e.g., sum-utilities or geometric mean) and the intervention represents a
7Throughout the paper, inequalities between vectors are intended component-wise.
9punishment, also assumptions A1-A3 are satisfied in these games and the absence of intervention
represents the intervention device’s preferred action d∗0.
B. Actions enforcement for the complete information game
We first introduce the framework to design incentives to enforce users’ actions in the complete
information scenario, though the main focus of this paper is the design of a system for an
incomplete information setting, dealing both with information revelation and action enforcement.
The notations and concepts introduced in the following will become useful later, when we study
the incomplete information scenario. In fact, some properties of the incomplete information game
(i.e., the game where users do not know the types of the other users) are linked to the properties
of the complete information game defined in this Subsection.
Given a randomized intervention rule π, we define the complete information game
Γt =
(
N , D,
{
U i(·, t)
}n
i=1
) (3)
that models the interaction between strategic users having types t. The utility functions U i(·, t)
are the expectations, over the randomized intervention rule, of the original utilities:
U i (d, t) = Ef [Ui (f, d, t)] =
∑
f∈F
π (f | t)Ui (f, d, t) (4)
where π (f | t) denotes the probability that the intervention device adopts the intervention rule
f ∈ F given that the type profile is t, and Ex [·] is the expectation operator with respect to the
random variable x.8
Analogously, we denote by U 0 the manager’s expected utility
U 0 (d, t) = Ef [U0 (f, d, t)] =
∑
f∈F
π (f | t)U0 (f, d, t) (5)
According to assumptions A1-A2, the manager’s expected utility is maximized when users adopt
action profile d∗(t) and the intervention device adopts action d∗0. However, in a strategic scenario
the users adopt the actions that maximize their own utilities, and the possible outcomes are
8There is some abuse of notation in using the same symbol to indicate a random variable and a particular realization, but this
will not lead to confusion.
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represented by the NEs. The NEs of the game Γt depend on the randomized intervention rule
selected by the manager because it affects the utilities of the users. Thus, the manager has to
design the randomized intervention rule so that there exists a NE of the game Γt that gives it the
highest utility among what is achievable with all possible NEs.
Definition 1. A randomized intervention rule π is said to sustain an action profile d ∈ D in Γt
if d is a NE of the game Γt, i.e., if
U i (d, t) ≥ U i
(
dˆi, d−i, t
)
, ∀ i ∈ N , ∀ dˆi ∈ Di (6)
If such π exists, we say that d is sustainable.
A randomized intervention rule π sustains an action profile d ∈ D in Γt without intervention
if π sustains d and f(d) = d∗0 for every intervention rule f such that π (f | t) > 0.9 If such π
exists, we say that d is sustainable without intervention.
Interpreting d∗0 as the absence of intervention, the expression sustainable without intervention is
here used to indicate that in the equilibrium the intervention action is not executed. We denote by
Fd,t the set of all randomized intervention rules, obtainable starting from the intervention rule set
F , that sustain d in Γt without intervention. The possibility of the manager to design a randomized
intervention rule capable of sustaining an action profile depends on the intervention capability,
namely, the action space D0 of the intervention device and the class of intervention rules F the
intervention device is able to implement. If we expand these sets, the manager has more degrees
of freedom in designing intervention rules capable of sustaining action profiles.
Definition 2. (D0,F) is an optimal intervention capability with respect to the complete informa-
tion game Γt if the maximum utility that the intervention device can obtain considering all the
sustainable action profiles cannot be improved by expanding D0 and F .
C. Coordination mechanism formulation for the incomplete information game
In this paper we consider the scenario where each user has private information, which is
synthesized in its type. Following Harsanyi’s approach [28], we study the incomplete information
9These definition can be easily extended for pure intervention rule: fˆ sustains d in Γt (without intervention) if pi sustains d in
Γt (without intervention), where pi (f | t) = 1 if f = fˆ , 0 otherwise.
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scenario assuming that each user acts based on the beliefs it has about the types of the other
users. In particular, we denote by Pt(·) the joint probability distribution of the type profile over
the type profile set T . We assume that each type profile has a positive probability to occur, i.e.,
Pt(τ) > 0, ∀ τ ∈ T . We denote by Pt−i(τ−i) the joint probability distribution of the type profile
of all the users except for user i over the set T−i (notice that user i knows its own type, ti). We
assume that, for each user i, Pt−i(τ−i) is consistent with Pt(·), i.e., Pt−i(τ−i) = Pt(ti, τ−i | ti).
To reach its objective, the manager may program the intervention device to elicit information
from users and to spread information into the system (notice that users’ behaviors, and therefore
the outcome of the system, depend on the information they have). We denote by Ri the set of
all reports that user i can transmit to the intervention device and by Mi the set of all messages
the intervention device can send to user i. As usual, we denote by ri ∈ Ri the report sent by
i, by r ∈ R = ×i∈NRi the report profile, by mi ∈ Mi the message sent to user i and by
m ∈M = ×i∈NMi the message profile. The messages sent and the randomized intervention rule
adopted by the intervention device may depend on the reports sent by users. Hence, given the
report profile r, we denote by mS(r) = (mS1 (r), . . . , mSn(r)), mSi : R → Mi, the messages sent
by the intervention device and by π (f | r) the probability that the intervention rule f ∈ F is
adopted. Following Myerson’s terminology [16], we refer to (R,M,mS, π) as the coordination
mechanism implemented by the intervention device.
The manager has to design the coordination mechanism to drive the outcome of the system
towards its objective. In doing so, it has to consider that users might both send reports and
adopt actions strategically, i.e., both information revelation and action enforcement issues must
be addressed at the same time. Once the coordination mechanism is established, the interaction
between users can be modeled as a Bayesian game
Γ =
(
N ,Φ,∆, T, Pt,
{
U i(·, ·, t)
}n
i=1
) (7)
In this context, a strategic user i selects its report ri ∈ Ri and its action di ∈ Di in order to
maximize its expected utility given the information and the beliefs it has. Precisely, a strategy for
user i consists of a couple of functions (φi, δi). φi : Ti → Ri represents the report of user i which
may depend on its type. δi : Mi × Ti → Di represents the action of user i which may depend on
its type and on the message received; in fact the received message can carry information about
12
the types of the other users, that can be exploited by i to select the most appropriate action. We
denote by φ = {φi}i∈N ∈ Φ the reporting strategy profile and by δ = {δi}i∈N ∈ ∆ the action
strategy profile.
Fig. 1 represents the different stages of the interaction between the users and the intervention
device, which are summarized in the following.
Stage 1: the intervention device announces the coordination mechanism
(
R,M,mS, π
)
10
Stage 2: each user i sends a report φi(t) to the intervention device
Stage 3: the intervention device sends a message mi = mSi (φi(t)) to each user i
Stage 4: each user i takes an action di = δi (mi, ti)
Stage 5: the intervention device monitors the users’ action profile d, picks an intervention rule f
following the distribution π (· | φ(t)), and adopts the action f(d)
The utility U i of each user is the expectation over the randomized intervention rule of the
original utilities, therefore, given the strategy profiles (φ, δ),
U i (φ, δ, t) = Ef
[
Ui
(
f, δ(mS(φ(t)), t), t
)]
=
∑
f∈F
π (f | φ(t))Ui
(
f, δ(mS(φ(t)), t), t
) (8)
In a Bayesian game a user selects its strategy in order to maximize the expectation of its utility
with respect to the initial beliefs about the types of the other players. The expected utility of a
user i having type ti is
Vi (φ, δ, ti) = Et−i|ti
[
U i (φ, δ, t)
]
=
∑
t−i∈T−i
∑
f∈F
Pt(t | ti)π (f | φ(t))Ui
(
f, δ(mS(φ(t)), t), t
) (9)
The strategy profiles (φ, δ) is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) of the game if, for each
user i ∈ N , for every type ti ∈ Ti and for every alternative strategy
(
φ˜i, δ˜i
)
for i,
Vi (φ, δ, ti) ≥ Vi
(
φ˜i, φ−i, δ˜i, δ−i, ti
)
(10)
10We remark the importance of communicating the mechanism and committing to it. If the intervention device could deviate
from the mechanism and select an action to maximize the manager’s utility, then, since A1 is satisfied, the intervention device
would adopt d∗0 independently of users’ actions. The users, foreseeing this behavior, would ignore the threat of the intervention
device and would play as if the intervention device were not present in the system. Conversely, forcing the intervention device to
follow the mechanism and communicating it to users, allows the manager to design credible threats and obtain better outcomes.
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Finally, the aim of the manager is to design an optimal coordination mechanism
(
R,M,mS, π
)
,
such that there is a BNE (φ, δ) that gives the manager the highest possible expected utility
V0 (φ, δ) = Et
[
Ef
[
U0
(
f, δ(mS(φ(t)), t), t
)]]
=
∑
t∈T
∑
f∈F
Pt(t)π (f | φ(t))U0
(
f, δ(mS(φ(t)), t), t
)
(11)
This formulation is rather abstract, so it may be worth to use a simple illustrative example to
remark our goal. Assume the manager has to assign a resource to 2 users. From a social point of
view, the best choice might be to assign the resource to the user having the higher valuation for
that resource. Using a conventional MD scheme, the manager might implement a Vickrey auction
to obtain the users’ valuations and to select the user with the higher valuation. However, if a user
could avoid the payment such method would fail its objective because that user could bid more
than what it is really willing to pay. Moreover, nothing would prevent the user that has lost the
auction from trying to access the resource. That is, conventional mechanism design relies on other
systems (e.g., a reliable infrastructure to collect money and punishments for the users that do not
respect the agreements) to be effective. Here we want to design a scheme that does not rely on
external systems. As an example, the intervention device might be a device that asks the users
to report their valuations and, based on that, proposes how to share the resource. If the users do
not respect such sharing the intervention device might jam their communication. The mechanism
used by the intervention device to propose the resource sharing and to jam users’ communication
must be designed to provide the incentive for both the users to report their true valuations and to
accept the proposed resource sharing.
III. OPTIMAL INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE DIRECT MECHANISMS
The design of an optimal coordination mechanism seems to be intractable since there are no
constraints on the sets Mi and Ri. Fortunately, the revelation principle [16] allows us to restrict
the attention to the class of incentive compatible direct mechanisms, among which the optimal
mechanism is also optimal in the class of all coordination mechanisms. In a direct mechanism users
report their types to the intervention device, and the intervention device sends them a suggested
action profile, i.e., Ri = Ti and Mi = Di, ∀i ∈ N . We denote by dS(r) = (dS1 (r), . . . , dSn(r)),
dSi : T → Di, the suggested action profile given the reported type profile t. We say that user i is
14
honest and obedient if it reports its real type and adopts the suggested action, i.e., if φi(ti) = ti and
δi(di, ti) = di, for every type ti ∈ Ti and suggested action di ∈ Di. Finally, a direct mechanism
is incentive compatible if the honest and obedient strategy profile is a BNE, i.e., if it provides
incentives for users to behave honestly and obediently.
The Optimal Incentive Compatible Direct Mechanism (OICDM) can be computed solving
OICDM argmax
dS ,pi
∑
t∈T
∑
f∈F
Pt(t)π (f | t)U0
(
f, dS(t), t
)
subject to:
π (f | t) ≥ 0 ,
∑
x∈F
π (x | t) = 1 , ∀f ∈ F , ∀t ∈ T
∑
t−i∈T−i
∑
f∈F
Pt(t | τi)π (f | t)Ui
(
f, dS(t), t
)
≥
≥
∑
t−i∈T−i
∑
f∈F
Pt(t | τi)π (f | t−i, τˆi)Ui
(
f, dS−i(τˆi, t−i), δˆi(d
S
i (t−i, τˆi)), t
)
∀ i ∈ {1, ..., n} , ∀ τi ∈ Ti, ∀ τˆi ∈ Ti, ∀ δˆi : Di → Di
The second set of constraints of OICDM represents the incentive compatible condition. It asserts
that when i’s type is τi, i does at least as well by being honest and obedient as by reporting τˆi
and then adopting δˆi(dSi (t−i, τˆi)) when told to adopt dSi (t−i, τˆi), assuming that the other users
are honest and obedient. If users were compliant to the manager’s instructions, the mechanism
could be thought as a way to retrieve the relevant information, compute the optimal policy and
recommend actions to users. In this scenario the optimal mechanism could be computed solving
OICDM without the second set of constraints. The design of a system that is robust against
self-interested strategic users translates mathematically in additional constraints to satisfy, which
represent the incentives given to users to follow the instructions. For this reason, the maximum
utility the manager can obtain with self-interested strategic users is never higher than the maximum
utility it can achieve with compliant users. We denote by V ME0 the maximum expected utility that
the manager can obtain when users are compliant, i.e.,
V ME0 =
∑
t∈T
Pt(t)U0(d
∗
0, d
∗(t), t) (12)
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We say that a direct mechanism is a maximum efficiency incentive compatible direct mechanism
if it is a solution of OICDM and the expected utility that the manager can achieve is equal to
the maximum efficiency utility.
Finally, we define the concept of optimal intervention capability also for the incomplete infor-
mation game Γ.
Definition 3. (D0,F) is an optimal intervention capability with respect to the incomplete infor-
mation game Γ if the solution of OICDM cannot be improved expanding D0 and F .
A. Properties of a maximum efficiency incentive compatible direct mechanism
In this Subsection we address the problem of the existence and the computation of a maximum
efficiency incentive compatible direct mechanism.
The first result we derive asserts that a maximum efficiency incentive compatible direct mecha-
nism exists if and only if, for every type profile t, the optimal action profile d∗(t) is sustainable in
the game with complete information Γt, and users have incentives to reveal their real type given
that they will adopt d∗(t) and the intervention device does not intervene. If this is the case, we
are also able to characterize all maximum efficiency incentive compatible direct mechanisms.
Proposition 1.
(
T,D, dS, π
)
is a maximum efficiency incentive compatible direct mechanism if
and only if, ∀t ∈ T ,
1: the optimal action profile d∗(t) of the game Γt is sustainable without intervention in Γt;
2: each user has incentives to report its real type, when other users do it and everybody is
adopting the optimal action profile d∗(t) and the intervention device never intervenes, i.e,∑
t−i∈T−i
Pt(t | τi)Ui (d
∗
0, d
∗(t), t) ≥
∑
t−i∈T−i
Pt(t | τi)Ui (d
∗
0, d
∗(τˆi, t−i), t)
∀ i ∈ N , ∀ τi ∈ Ti, ∀ τˆi ∈ Ti, (13)
3: the suggested action profile is the optimal action profile of game Γt, i.e., dS(t) = d∗(t);
4: the randomized intervention rule sustains without intervention d∗(t) in Γt, i.e., π(· | t) ∈
Fd
∗(t),t
.
Proof: See Appendix A
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Conditions 1-2 are related to the structure of the game without intervention device, while
conditions 3-4 say how to obtain a maximum efficiency direct mechanism once 1-2 are satisfied.
In the second result we combine condition 2 of Proposition 1 with assumptions A3-A6 to derive a
sufficient condition on users’ type set structures under which a maximum efficiency incentive com-
patible direct mechanism does not exist. We define the bin size βk of user k’s type set, Tk, as the
maximum distance between two consecutive elements of Tk: βk = maxs∈{1,...,mk−1} (τk,s+1 − τk,s).
We define the bin size β as the maximum between the bin sizes of all users: β = maxk∈N βk.
Proposition 2. There exists a threshold bin size ζ > 0 so that if β ≤ ζ then a maximum efficiency
incentive compatible direct mechanism does not exist.
Proof: Let k ∈ N and τk ∈ Tk be such that dNE0k (τk, t−i) > d∗k(τk, t−i), ∀ t−i ∈ T−i. We
rewrite condition 2 of Proposition 1 for users k and type τk:∑
t
−k∈T−k
Pt(t | τk)Ui (d
∗
0, d
∗(t), t) ≥
∑
t
−k∈T−k
Pt(t | τk)Ui (d
∗
0, d
∗(τˆk, t−k), t) , ∀ τˆk ∈ Tk, (14)
We have dBRk (d∗−k, t−k, τk) ≥ dBRk (dNE
0
−k , t−k, τk) = d
NE0
k (t−k, τk) > d
∗
k(t−k, τk), where the first
inequality is valid for the submodularity.
Let τ˜k(t−k) be the type τ so that d∗(τ, t−k) = dBRk (d∗−k, t−k, τk) if it exists (in this case A3
guarantees it is greater than τk) and it is lower than tk, and τ˜k(t−k) = tk otherwise. Let τˆk =
mint
−k
τ˜k(t−k). If (τk, τˆk]
⋂
Tk 6= ∅ (in particular, this is true if β ≤ τˆk − τk = ζ), ∀τm ∈
(τk, τˆk]
⋂
Tk we obtain
Uk (d
∗
0, d
∗(t−k, τm), t−k, τk) > Uk (d
∗
0, d
∗(t−k, τk), t−kτk) , ∀ t−k ∈ T−k (15)
contradicting Eq. (14).
Interpretation: when user k’s type is τk, k’s resource usage that maximizes the manager’s utility,
d∗k(τk, t−k), is lower than the one that maximizes k’s utility, dBRk (d∗−k, τk, t−k), ∀ t−k ∈ T−k. If k
reports a type τm slightly higher than τk, then the intervention device suggests a slightly higher
resource usage, allowing k to obtain a higher utility. Hence, k has an incentive to cheat and
resources are not allocated as efficiently as possible. To avoid this situation, the intervention
device might decrease the resources given to a type τm. In this case the loss of efficiency occurs
when the real type of k is τm and it does not receive the resources it would deserve. There is
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no way to avoid the loss of efficiency associated to both case tk = τk and case tk = τm, both
occurring with positive probability.
It is worth noting that we consider finite type sets and a finite intervention rule set mainly
to simplify the logical exposition. However, all results might be derived also with infinite and
continuous sets.11 In particular, if type sets are continuous Proposition 2 implies that a maximum
efficiency incentive compatible direct mechanism never exists.
B. Properties of optimal incentive compatible direct mechanisms
If a maximum efficiency incentive compatible direct mechanism exists, the optimal incentive
compatible direct mechanisms set coincides with the maximum efficiency incentive compatible
direct mechanisms set, that is characterized in Proposition 1. However, finding an optimal incentive
compatible direct mechanism in the general case, solving OICDM, may be computationally hard.
In this Subsection we consider some additional conditions to simplify the problem. First we
assume that the manager’s utility is a function of the users’ utilities. Moreover, we suppose that
the intervention capability (D0,F) is such that, for each type profile t ∈ T , every action profile
d ∈ D lower than the NE action profile of the game Γ0t is sustainable without intervention in Γt
(i.e., d ≤ dNE0(t) implies Fd,t non empty). Finally, we assume that, for each type profile t ∈ T
and for every action profile d ∈ D, the utility of a user i adopting the lowest action dmini is
equal to 0, i.e., Ui(d∗0, dmini , d−i, t) = 0. Interpreting dmini as no resource usage, this means that,
independently of types and other users’ actions, a user that does not use resources obtains no
utility.
Lemma 3. The utility of user i is non increasing in the actions of the other users.
Proof:
Ui(d
∗
0, d, t) = Ui(d
∗
0, 0, d−i, t) +
∫ di
0
∂Ui(d
∗
0, x, d, t)
∂x
∂x =
∫ di
0
∂Ui(d
∗
0, x, d, t)
∂x
∂x
∂Ui(d
∗
0, d, t)
∂dj
=
∫ di
0
∂2Ui(d
∗
0, x, d, t)
∂x∂dj
∂x ≤ 0 (16)
11For the continuous case, probability distributions and sums must be substituted with probability density functions and integrals.
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where the inequality is valid for the submodularity.
The following result allows the manager to further restrict the class of mechanisms to take into
consideration.
Lemma 4. There exists an optimal incentive compatible direct mechanisms such that, ∀ t ∈ T ,
the randomized intervention rule sustains the suggested action profile without intervention in Γt.
Proof: See Appendix B
Lemma 4 suggests the idea to decouple the original problem, OICDM, into two sub-problems.
First we can calculate the optimal suggested action profile dS(t) under the constraint that users
adopting that action profile have incentives to report their real type. Finally, it is sufficient to
identify an intervention rule able to sustain dS(t) without intervention in Γt. This is formalized
in the following.
Consider the mechanism
(
T,D, d
S
, π
)
, where
d
S
= argmax
dS
∑
t∈T
Pt(t)U0
(
d∗0, d
S(t), t
)
subject to:∑
t−i∈T−i
Pt(t | τi)Ui
(
d∗0, d
S(t−i, τi), t
)
≥
∑
t−i∈T−i
Pt(t | τi)Ui
(
d∗0, d
S
−i(t−i, τˆi), δˆi(d
S
i (t−i, τˆi)), t
)
∀ i ∈ {1, ..., n} , ∀ τi ∈ Ti, ∀ τˆi ∈ Ti, ∀ δˆi : Di → Di (17)
and, ∀ t ∈ T ,
π (· | t) ∈ Fd
S
,t (18)
Proposition 5. The mechanism
(
T,D, d
S
, π
)
is an optimal incentive compatible direct mechanism.
Proof: Eq. (18) says that we are looking for a mechanism where, ∀ t ∈ T , the randomized
intervention rule sustains the suggested action profile without intervention in Γt. Moreover, the
constraint of Eq. (17) says that the users have the incentive to reveal their true types if they adopt
the suggested action profile. Lemma 4 states that such a class of mechanisms is optimal, hence,
the solution of Eqs. (17)-(18) gives an optimal incentive compatible direct mechanism.
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Corollary 6. The intervention capability (D0,F) is optimal with respect to Γ.
IV. SUB-OPTIMAL INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE DIRECT MECHANISMS
In this Section we provide practical tools for the manager to design efficient coordination
mechanisms. Although we have characterized the optimal mechanism, other schemes are also of
interest, for several reasons. First of all, the optimal intervention scheme may be very difficult
to compute, even in the decoupled version of Eqs. (17)-(18). It is therefore of some interest
to consider intervention schemes that are sub-optimal but easy to compute. Moreover, in some
situations, it may not be possible for the users to communicate with the manager, so it is natural to
consider intervention schemes that do not require the users to make reports. In the following, we
address both issues. In Subsection IV-A we describe an algorithm that converges to an incentive
compatible direct mechanism where the recommended actions are as close as possible to the
optimal ones. In Subsection IV-B we consider a mechanism that is independent of users’ reports.
A. Algorithm that converges to an incentive compatible direct mechanism
In this Section we propose a general algorithm (see Algorithm 1) that converges to an incentive
compatible direct mechanism. Such algorithm is run by the intervention device at the beginning of
the interaction with the users in order to obtain the mechanism to adopt. After that, the interaction
between the intervention device and the users is as usual: the intervention device communicates the
mechanism, the users report their type, the intervention device suggests the actions to adopt, the
users take actions, and finally the intervention device monitors users’ actions and intervenes. This
algorithm can be applied when the suggested action profile, for every type profile t and at each
step of the algorithm, is sustainable without intervention in Γt. The suggested action profile will
never be lower than the optimal action profile d∗(t) and higher than the NE action profile dNE0(t)
of Γ0t , so it is sufficient that Fd,t is non empty ∀ t ∈ T and ∀ d ∈ D so that d∗(t) ≤ d ≤ dNE
0
(t).
We denote by Wi(ti, tˆi) the expected utility that user i, with type ti, obtains reporting type tˆi
and adopting the suggested action, assuming that the other users are honest and obedient, i.e.,
Wi(ti, tˆi) =
∑
t−i∈T−i
∑
f∈F
Pt(t | ti)π
(
f | tˆ
)
Ui
(
f, dS(tˆ), t
) (19)
20
where we used the notation tˆ =
(
t1, . . . , ti−1, tˆi, ti+1, . . . , tn
)
.
The algorithm has been designed with the idea to minimize the distance between the optimal
action profile d∗(t) and the suggested action profile dS(t), for each possible type profile t. To
explain the idea behind the algorithm we use Fig. 2, where i’s utility is plotted with respect to i’s
action, for a fixed type profile t and assuming the other users adopt the suggested actions dS−i(t).
The algorithm initializes the suggested action profile dS(t) equal to the optimal action profile
d∗(t) and selects a randomized intervention rule π (· | t) that sustains it without intervention,
for every type profile t ∈ T . This situation is represented by the upper-left Fig. 2. Also the
NE and i’s best response action are represented, dNE0(t) and dBR(dS−i(t)). By assumption A6
d∗(t) ≤ dNE
0
(t) and by assumption A5 dNE0(t) ≤ dBR(dS−i(t)), because dS−i(t) ≤ dNE
0
−i (t). If
Wi(ti, ti) ≥ Wi(ti, tˆi), for every alternative i’s reported type tˆi, then user i has an incentive to
report its true type ti. If, at a certain iteration of the algorithm, this is valid for all users and for
all types they may have, then the algorithm stops and an incentive compatible direct mechanism
is obtained.12
Conversely, suppose there exists a user i and types ti and tˆi such that Wi(ti, ti) < Wi(ti, tˆi), i.e.,
user i has the incentive to report tˆi when its type is ti. Then the suggested action dSi (t) is increased
by a quantity equal to ǫi, moving it in the direction of the best response function dBRi (dS−i(t)), for
every possible combination of types t−i of the other users, and updates the randomized intervention
rule π (· | t) in order to sustain without intervention the new suggested action profile. This has the
effect, as represented by upper-right Fig. 2, to increase Ui
(
d∗0, d
S(t), t
)
, ∀ t−i ∈ T−i, and therefore
also the expected utility of i when it has type ti and it is honest, W (ti, ti). This procedure is
repeated as long as Wi(ti, ti) < Wi(ti, tˆi) and dSi (t) ≤ dNE
0
i (t). In case i’s suggested action dSi (t)
reaches dNE0i (t) and still Wi(ti, ti) < Wi(ti, tˆi), then the suggested action of user k, dSk (t), is
increased by a quantity equal to ǫk, ∀ k ∈ N , k 6= i, ∀ t−i ∈ T−i. As we can see from lower-
left Fig. 2, this means to move the best response function dBRi (dS−i(t)) in the direction of the
suggested action dSi (t). If dSk (t) reaches dNE
0
k (t) as well, ∀ k ∈ N , then dS−i(t) coincides with the
12Notice that, if a maximum efficiency incentive compatible direct mechanism exists, since it must satisfy the conditions of
Proposition 1, then the initialization of the algorithm corresponds to a maximum efficiency incentive compatible direct mechanism
and the algorithm stops after the first iteration.
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best response function dBR(dS−i(t)), as represented in the lower-right Fig. 2. In fact, by definition,
the NE is the action profile such that every user is playing its best response action against the
actions of the other users. Since dSi (t) coincides with dBR(dS−i(t)), ∀ t−i ∈ T−i, user i is told to
play its best action for every possible combination of the types of the other users. Hence, user
i cannot increase its utility reporting a different type tˆi, therefore the mechanism is incentive
compatible.
The algorithm stops the first time each user has the incentive to declare its real type. Since at each
iteration the suggested action profiles are increased by a fixed amount, the algorithm converges
after a finite number of iterations. The higher the steps ǫi, i ∈ N , the lower the convergence time
of the algorithm. On the other hand, the lower the steps, the closer the suggested action profile
to the optimal one.13
Algorithm 1 General algorithm.
1: Initialization: ∀ t ∈ T , dS(t) = d∗(t), π (· | t) ∈ FdS ,t.
2: For each user i ∈ N and each couple of states ti, tˆi ∈ Ti
3: If Wi(ti, ti) < Wi(ti, tˆi)
4: If dSi (ti, t−i) < dNE
0
i (ti, t−i) for some t−i ∈ T−i
5: dSi (ti, t−i)← min
{
dSi (ti, t−i) + ǫi, d
NE0
i (ti, t−i)
}
, π (· | t) ∈ Fd
S ,t
, ∀ t−i ∈ T−i
6: Else
7: dSk (ti, t−i) ← min
{
dSk (ti, t−i) + ǫk, d
NE0
k (ti, t−i)
}
, π (· | t) ∈ Fd
S ,t
, ∀k ∈ N , k 6= i,
∀ t−i ∈ T−i
8: Repeat from 2 until 3 is unsatisfied ∀ i, ti, t−i
B. A priori direct mechanism
In this Subsection we consider a new type of mechanism, namely an a priori mechanism,
where users’ reports do not play any role for the final outcome. This is particularly useful in
13Notice that, since no assumption such as convexity is made for the manager’s expected utility V0, an action profile closer to
the optimal one does not necessarily imply a better outcome for the manager.
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situations where it is not possible for the users to communicate with the manager. However,
also for scenarios where users can send reports, an a priori mechanism might represent a good
sub-optimal mechanism that is efficient and easy to compute.
Definition 4.
(
T,D, dS, π
)
is an a priori direct mechanism if it is a direct mechanism and the
suggested action profile dS and the selected randomized intervention rule π do not depend on
users’ reports.
(
T,D, dS, π
)
is an a priori incentive compatible direct mechanism if it is an a
priori direct mechanism and it is incentive compatible.
In an a priori direct mechanism stages 1-3 described in Subsection II-C can be compressed in
only one stage in which the intervention device communicates to the users the suggested action
profile dS and the randomized intervention rule π. In an a priori incentive compatible direct
mechanism the incentive compatibility condition must be checked only for users’ actions and
OICDM simplifies in14
argmax
dS ,pi
∑
t∈T
∑
f∈F
Pt(t)π (f)U0
(
f, dS, t
)
subject to:
π (f) ≥ 0 ,
∑
x∈F
π (x | t) = 1 , ∀f ∈ F
∑
t−i∈T−i
∑
f∈F
Pt(t | τi)π (f)Ui
(
f, dS, t
)
≥
∑
t−i∈T−i
∑
f∈F
Pt(t | τi)π (f)Ui
(
f, dS−i, δˆi(d
S
i ), t
)
∀ i ∈ {1, ..., n} , ∀ τi ∈ Ti, ∀ δˆi : Di → Di (20)
Definition 5. A randomized intervention rule π sustains an action profile d ∈ D in Γ if d is a
BNE of the game Γ, i.e., if, ∀ i ∈ N , ∀ τi ∈ Ti , ∀ d˜i ∈ Di,∑
t−i∈T−i
∑
f∈F
Pt(t | τi)π (f | t)Ui (f, d, t) ≥
∑
t−i∈T−i
∑
f∈F
Pt(t | τi)π (f | t)Ui
(
f, d˜i, d−i, t
)
(21)
14Notice that the optimal a priori incentive compatible direct mechanism attainable solving (20) is in general suboptimal compared
to the optimal a priori direct mechanism. In fact, the revelation principle does not hold for a priori mechanisms since we are
adding an additional constraint, forcing the mechanism to be independent of users’ reports.
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A randomized intervention rule π sustains an action profile d ∈ D in Γt without intervention if
π sustains d and f(d) = d∗0 for every intervention rule f such that π (f | t) > 0. If such π exists,
we say that d is sustainable without intervention.
If any action profile is sustainable without intervention in Γ, then (20) can be decoupled and
an optimal a priori incentive compatible direct mechanism can be computed as a solution to the
following unconstrained optimization problem:
d
S
= argmax
dS
∑
t∈T
Pt(t)U0
(
d∗0, d
S, t
) (22)
and π (f) sustains dS in Γ without intervention.
V. APPLICATION TO FLOW CONTROL
In this Section we apply the results derived in Sections III and IV for the abstract framework
to a concrete scenario: the design of a flow control management system.
A. Formulation of the flow control problem
We consider n Poisson streams of packets with arrival rates d1, d2, ..., dn that are serviced by a
single server with exponentially distributed service times with mean 1
µ
. Since we assume that all
packets have the same length, we will talk interchangeably of arrival rate (pkt
s
) and transmission
rate (Mbps), and µ can be seen as the channel capacity, in pkt
s
, after the server.15 We refer to
each stream of packets as a user. We assume that each user i can control its own traffic (e.g.,
by adjusting the coding quality of its communication), i.e., it can select its transmission rate
di ∈ Di = [0, µ]. As represented by Fig. 4, the system is an M/M/1 queue with an input arrival
rate λ =
∑n
i=1 di.
In most cases a user is faced with two conflicting objectives, i.e., to maximize its throughput16
and to minimize its average delay. The conflict between throughput and delay is obvious since as
15We consider packets of the same length to keep a simple notation and because the qualitative results are not affected by this
hypothesis. However, the model and the analysis can be easily extended to take into account packets of different lengths.
16Here the throughput refers to the traffic the server is able to service, i.e., the transmission rate available to the user, and does
not take into account the packets lost due to physical layer transmission errors.
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more traffic enters the server queue the delays become larger. In order to incorporate these two
measures in a single performance metric, the concept of power has been proposed in [29] and
later extended in [30]. It is defined as the ratio between the throughput and the average delay,
where the exponent of the throughput is a positive constant. We can therefore write i’s utility as
Ui(d, ti) = d
ti
i (µ− λ) = d
ti
i
(
µ−
n∑
i=1
di
)
(23)
where d = (d1, . . . , dn) denotes the transmission rate profile and the parameter ti > 0 represents
user i’s type.
The value of ti may depend, for example, on the quality of service of the application corre-
sponding to the i-th stream of packets. As we will see in Eqs. (25) and (29), both considering
compliant users and strategic users, the rate adopted by a user is increasing in its type. This
consideration suggests the idea that the higher the type of a user, the higher the importance of
the rate, with respect to the delay, for that user. As an example, streams of packets associated to
delay dependent applications should have a low type while streams of packets associated to delay
tolerant applications should have a high type.
In general, the applications a server has to deal with may change over time. For this reason it
is useful to define a common type set Ti = {τ1, τ2, ..., τm}, m ∈ N, τk ∈ R, τ1 < τ2 < ... < τm,
∀i ∈ N = {1, 2, ..., n}, whose elements represent all the possible types of users a server has to
deal with. Suppose that at the beginning of the communication a user does not know the types
of the other users and the intervention device itself does not know the types of the users. We
assume that a common probability distribution exists and that user types are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) with P (ti) denoting the probability that a user has type ti, ti ∈ Ti,
and Pt(t) =
∏n
i=1 P (ti) the probability that the type profile is t, t ∈ T = T ni . P (ti) can be thought
as the average fraction of applications having type ti that require services to the server.
The network must be designed to operate efficiently following the manager’s objective, which
can be quantified by a utility function. We assume that the manager’s utility is the geometric mean
of the users’ utilities:
U0(d, t) =
n
√√√√ n∏
i=1
U+i (d, ti) = (µ− λ)
+
n∏
i=1
d
ti
n
i (24)
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where (x)+ = max {x , 0}.17 This choice allows to maintain a balance between two competing
interests a benevolent manager might have: to maximize the social welfare of the network (defined
as the sum utility) and to allocate resources fairly, giving to users similar utilities. Notice that
maximizing U0(d, t) with respect to users’ actions is equivalent to maximizing a proportional
fairness of users’ utilities, i.e.,
∑n
i=1 lnU
+
i (d, ti), and the optimal solution d∗ = {d∗i }
n
i=1 is given
by (see [6])
d∗i (t) =
tiµ
n+
∑n
k=1 tk
(25)
We denote by Vi(d(t), ti) and V0(d(t)) the expected (with respect to the types) utilities of user
i having type ti and of the manager, where d(t) represents the action adopted by the users when
the type profile is t, i.e.,
Vi(d(t), ti) =
∑
t−i∈T−i
Pt(t | ti)Ui(d(t), t) (26)
V0(d(t)) =
∑
t∈T
Pt(t)U0(d(t), t) (27)
Hence, the maximum expected utility that the manager can obtain when users are compliant is
V ME0 = V0(d
∗(t)).
B. The flow control games
In this Subsection we compute the outcome of a flow control problem considering self-interested
and strategic users, for both the complete and the incomplete information scenarios. Moreover,
we quantify the loss of efficiency of the manager’s utility with respect to the maximum efficiency
utility.
17 We consider U+i instead of Ui for mathematical reasons, because utilities as defined in Eq. (31) may also be negative, and
the geometric mean would lose meaning with negative quantities. Anyway, notice that it is in the self interest of both the users
and the manager to have λ ≤ µ, i.e., working in the sub-space of the original domain such that U+i = Ui.
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1) The complete information game Γ0t : We define the complete information game
Γ0t =
(
N , D, {Ui(·, t)}
N
i=1
)
(28)
where each user i selects its action di(t) strategically, knowing the types t of all the users.
The unique NE dNE0i (t) of Γ0t is, ∀ i ∈ N , (see [6])
dNE
0
i (t) =
tiµ
1 +
∑n
k=1 tk
(29)
Notice that strategic users use the resources more heavily with respect to compliant users, i.e.,
dNE
0
i (t) > d
∗
i (t), ∀ i ∈ N and ∀ t ∈ T (excluding the trivial case n = 1).
The manager’s expected utility in the complete information scenario is equal to V0(dNE
0
(t)).
2) The Bayesian game Γ0: We define the incomplete information game
Γ0 = (N , D, T, Pt, {Ui(·, t)}
n
i=1) (30)
where each user i selects its action di(ti) strategically, knowing its own type ti and the probability
distribution over the types of the other users, Pt.
Proposition 7. There exists a unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium dBNE(t) of Γ0 which can be
obtained by solving a linear system AdBNE = b. In addition, the inverse of A, A−1, can be
computed analytically.18
Proof: See Appendix C.
The manager’s expected utility in the incomplete information scenario is equal to V0(dBNE(t)).
3) Results: Fig. 4 shows the manager’s expected utility with respect to the number of users,
considering µ = 5Mbps and a type set Ti = {0.1, 1} with uniformly distributed types. The
upper curve represents the maximum efficiency utility, attainable when users are compliant to
the manager, while the dashed and the dotted lines represent the manager’s utility when users
are strategic in the complete and incomplete information cases respectively. The manager’s utility
when users act strategically, both for the complete and incomplete information scenarios, is far
below compared to the maximum efficiency utility. Notice that the manager can obtain a higher
utility in the incomplete information scenario with respect to the complete information scenario,
18The expressions of b, A and A−1 can be found in Appendix C.
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at least when there are more than three users in the system. This agrees with the results of [31],
[32] where, in a strategic setting, the less closely related the agents’ goals the lower the quantity
of information they prefer to exchange. In our case, the objective of the manager becomes less
closely related to the objective of a single user as the number of total users increases. In fact, the
manager’s objective is to increase the utility of all users in a fair way, while the goal of a user
is to improve only its own utility, at the cost of the utility of all the other users. Hence, as the
number of users increases, the selfishness of a single user has a higher negative impact on the
manager’s objective.
C. The flow control games with intervention
Fig. 4 shows that the manager’s expected utility in strategic settings is much lower that the
manager’s expected utility in cooperative settings, when users are compliant. Here we ask whether
the manager can design the system in order to make it robust against self-interest strategic users,
filling, at least partially, the gap between the maximum efficiency utility and the manager’s
expected utility in strategic settings.
Using the same notations as in Section II, we consider an intervention device that transmits a
stream of packets to the server with a rate d0 ∈ D0 =
[
0, dM0
]
, following an intervention rule
f : D → D0. dM0 represents the maximum rate the intervention device is able to transmit. The
framework introduced is Subsection V-A can be easily modified to take into account the effect of
the intervention device, that increases the incoming traffic of the server λ =
∑n
i=1 di+ f(d). The
users’ and the manager’s utilities change accordingly:
Ui(f, d, ti) = d
ti
i (µ− λ) = d
ti
i
(
µ−
n∑
i=1
di − f(d)
)
U0(f, d, t) =
n
√√√√ n∏
i=1
U+i (f, d, ti) = (µ− λ)
+
n∏
i=1
d
ti
n
i (31)
It is straightforward to check that the users’ and the manager’s utilities satisfy assumptions
A1-A6. In particular, the manager’s preferred action is d0 = 0 (i.e., no intervention), and the
game Γ0t defined in Subsection II-A coincides with the game Γ0t defined in Subsection V-B2.
In the following we define a simple class of intervention rules, the class of affine intervention
rules, where the intervention level increases linearly with the users’ actions. We limit the design of
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intervention rules to affine intervention rules, i.e., F coincides with the class of affine intervention
rules. It may seem restrictive to constrain the intervention device to such a simple class of
intervention rules. However, under certain conditions, the class of affine intervention rules will
turn out to be optimal, i.e., it is not possible to increase the manager’s utility by expanding the
intervention rule set F .
Definition 6. f : D → D0 is an affine intervention rule if
f(d) =
[
n∑
i=1
ci(di − d˜i)
]dM0
0
(32)
for certain parameters d˜i ≥ 0 and ci ≥ 0, where [·]ba = min {max {a, ·} , b}.
In an affine intervention rule, d˜i represents a target action for user i while ci represents the
rate of increase of the intervention level due to an increase of i’s action. If the action profile d
is lower than or equal to the target action profile d˜ =
(
d˜1, · · · , d˜n
)
, then the intervention level is
equal to 0. If the intervention level is higher than 0, then some user is adopting an action higher
then the target one. In this case, an increase by an amount ǫ of i’s action causes an increase in
the intervention level by an amount ciǫ.
Fig. 5 shows how an affine intervention rule changes the relation between i’s utility and i’s
action. The utility of user i is plotted for tree cases: assuming that the intervention device never
intervenes and assuming that the intervention device adopts a linear intervention rule, for two
different values of the parameter ci. We consider that the other users adopt the target action profile.
For an action di lower than the target action d˜i, i’s utility is as if the intervention device did not
exist. However, for an action di higher than the target action d˜i, i’s utility is lower compared to the
utility it would have obtained without intervention device, and the gap increases as ci increases.
In the following, we provide the tools for the manager to design the intervention rule, for both
the complete and the incomplete information scenarios.
1) The complete information game Γt: This is the scenario considered in Subsection II-B, where
the users adopt actions strategically, knowing the type of the other users and the intervention rule.
The interaction between users is modeled with the game Γt,
Γt = (N , D, {Ui(f, ·, ti)}
n
i=1) , (33)
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where the utilities Ui, i ∈ N , are calculated as in Eq. (31). The outcome of such interaction is
represented by the NE.
The manager faces the problem of designing a randomized intervention rule so that there exists
a NE of the game Γt that gives it the highest utility among what is achievable with all possible
NEs. We will see that it can reach this objective considering only pure intervention rules, which
are simpler to implement than randomized intervention rules.
Lemma 8. Consider the affine intervention rule f such that, for every user i ∈ N ,
ci ≥
ti
(
µ−
∑n
k=1 d˜k
)
− d˜i
d˜i
, dM0 ≥
ci
[
ti
(
µ−
∑n
k=1 d˜k
)
− d˜i
]
1 + ti(1 + ci)
(34)
If d˜ ≤ dNE0 , then f sustains d˜ in Γt without intervention.
Proof: See Appendix D
Interpretation: Selecting a ci high enough and if the intervention device is able to transmit with
a large enough transmission rate, the threat of punishment discourages the users from adopting
actions higher than the target. This situation is shown in Fig. 5 for ci = 2. Hence, if the utility
of user i is increasing before the target action d˜i (in particular, this is valid if d˜i ≤ dNE0i ), as in
Fig. 5, the target action d˜i becomes the best response action for user i.
Proposition 9. If dM0 ≥
µ
1 + τ1
, then the optimal strategy profile d∗(t), ∀t ∈ T , is sustainable
without intervention using an affine intervention rule f with d˜ = d∗(t) and ci ≥ n− 1.
If dM0 ≥ µ, then every strategy profile d ≤ dNE0(t), ∀t ∈ T , is sustainable without intervention
using an affine intervention rule f with a high enough ci, i ∈ N .
Proof: First, consider the second affirmation. The condition of Eq. (34) on dM0 is automatically
satisfied if the right hand side is lower than 0. Moreover, if it is higher than 0, the right hand side
is increasing in ci. In fact, the function g(ci) = acib+dci , with a, b ≥ 0, is increasing in ci, because
g′(ci) =
ab
(b+dci)2
> 0. Thus, the condition of Eq. (34) on dM0 becomes stricter as ci increases.
Taking the limit for ci → +∞ we can find the following stricter condition on dM0 that does not
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depend on ci:
dM0 ≥
ti
(
µ−
∑n
k=1 d˜k
)
− d˜i
ti
= µ−
n∑
k=1
d˜k −
d˜i (ti + 1)
ti
(35)
In order to obtain conditions that are independent of users’ types and action profiles to sustain,
we can consider the following stricter conditions:
dM0 ≥ µ−
n∑
k=1
d˜k −
d˜i (τm + 1)
τm
, dM0 ≥ µ (36)
As for ci, we can find a stricter condition independent of users’ types substituting ti with τm.
Thus, once the action profile to sustain is fixed, it is sufficient to select a ci satisfying
ci ≥
τm
(
µ−
∑n
k=1 d˜k
)
− d˜i
d˜i
(37)
Now consider the first affirmation. Substituting d∗(t) into Eq. (34) we obtain
ci ≥
ti
(
µ−
∑n
k=1 d˜k
)
d˜i
− 1 = n+
n∑
k=1
tk −
tiµ
∑n
k=1 tk
tiµ
− 1 = n− 1 (38)
As to dM0 , substituting d∗(t) into the first condition of Eq. (36) we obtain
dM0 ≥ µ− µ
∑n
k=1 tk
n+
∑n
k=1 tk
=
nµ
n +
∑n
k=1 tk
(39)
Finally, since the right hand side is decreasing in
∑n
k=1 tk, a stricter condition can be obtained
substituting tk = τ1, ∀k ∈ N , obtaining
dM0 ≥
µ
1 + τ1
(40)
If the intervention device is able to transmit a stream of packets with a rate higher than a certain
threshold (that is upper-bounded by µ), the manager can extract the maximum utility from the
game Γt adopting pure affine intervention rules. The following corollary is an implication of this
consideration.
Corollary 10. If dM0 ≥
µ
1 + τ1
, then the class of affine intervention rules is optimal with respect
to Γt.
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Finally, the manager’s expected utility for the complete information scenario with intervention
device, considering affine intervention rules and assuming the condition on dM0 is satisfied, is
equal to the maximum efficiency utility V0(d∗(t)).
2) The Bayesian game Γ: This is the scenario considered in Subsection II-C, where the users
adopt actions strategically, knowing their own type and the probability distribution over the types
of the other users. The manager faces the problem of designing a direct mechanism
(
T,D, dS, π
)
so that the outcome of the system maximizes its own utility. The interaction between users is
modeled with the game Γ defined by Eq. (7). Since assumptions A1-A6 are satisfied, we exploit
the results obtained in Section III for the abstract framework.
• Existence and calculation of a maximum efficiency incentive compatible direct mechanism.
We wonder if there are some conditions under which the manager can design a mechanism to
obtain the same utility it would achieve with compliant users. The following result provides
an answer to this question.
Proposition 11. If ∀ τi ∈ Ti and ∀ t−i ∈ T−i,(
n +
∑
j 6=i tj + τi+1
n +
∑
j 6=i tj + τi
)τi+1(
τi
τi+1
)τi
≥ 1 (41)
then the mechanism
(
T,D, d
S
, π
)
where, ∀ t ∈ T ,
d
S
(t) = d∗(t)
π (· | t) ∈ Fd
S
,t (42)
is a maximum efficiency incentive compatible direct mechanism.
Proof: See Appendix E
• Characterization of the optimal incentive compatible direct mechanism.
In case a maximum efficiency incentive compatible direct mechanism does not exists, the manager
faces the problem of designing a mechanism such that it obtains a utility as close as possible to
the maximum efficiency utility. If dM0 ≥ µ, all additional assumptions made in Subsection III-B
are satisfied. Hence, according to Proposition 5, there exists an optimal incentive compatible direct
mechanisms such that the intervention device adopts a randomized intervention rule that sustains
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without intervention the suggested action profile. Such a mechanism can be calculated by solving
independently Eqs. (17) and (18), and (18) can be solved considering pure affine intervention
rules that are simpler to implement than randomized intervention rules. Moreover, according to
Corollary 6, the class of affine intervention rules is optimal with respect to Γ. Unfortunately,
the solution of Eq. (17) is hard to compute. For this reason, in the following we consider the
suboptimal mechanisms proposed in Section IV.
• Algorithm that converges to an incentive compatible direct mechanism.
As for the abstract framework in Subsection IV-A, we consider an algorithm (see Algorithm
2), optimized for the flow control scenario, that converges to an incentive compatible direct
mechanism.
Algorithm 2 Flow control algorithm.
1: Initialization: ∀ t ∈ T , dS(t) = d∗(t), π(f˜ | t) = 1 for a certain f˜ ∈ FdS ,t and π(f | t) = 0
for f 6= f˜ .
2: For s = 1 : m
3: For l = 1 : m
4: If Wi(τs, τs) < Wi(τs, τl)
5: dSi (τl, t−i)← min
{
dSi (τl, t−i) + ǫi, d
NE0
i (τl, t−i)
}
, π(f˜ | t)← 1 for a certain f˜ ∈ FdS ,t
and π(f | t) = 0 for f 6= f˜ , ∀ t−i ∈ T−i
6: Repeat from 2 until 4 is unsatisfied ∀ s and l
• A priori mechanism.
Consider the a priori mechanism where the intervention device, independently of users’ types,
suggests action profile d and adopts the affine intervention rule f ,
d = argmin
d
− ln
(
µ−
n∑
i=1
di
)
Et
[
n∏
i=1
d
ti
n
i
]
di ≥ 0 , di ≤ µ , ∀i ∈ N (43)
Proposition 12. Eq. (43) defines a convex problem if τm ≤ n. Moreover, if the randomized
intervention rule π sustains d without intervention in Γ, then
(
T,D, d, π
)
is an optimal a priori
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incentive compatible mechanism and the manager’s expected utility is V0(d).
Proof: See Appendix F
D. Results
In the following we are going to quantify the manager’s expected utility and the expected
throughput and delay for each type of user in different scenarios. We consider µ = 5Mbps and
a common type set Ti = {0.1, 1}. Except for Fig. 7, we assume that the types are uniformly
distributed, i.e., P (0.1) = P (1) = 0.5, and we plot the results varying the number of users from
2 to 16.
We first look at how the manager’s expected utility varies increasing the number of users, in
the complete and incomplete information scenarios. The left side of Fig. 6 refers to the complete
information scenario. The overlapped upper lines represent the manager’s expected utility when
users are compliant and when they are strategic with an intervention device that adopts the optimal
intervention rule derived in Subsection V-C1. The manager’s expected utility is decreasing in the
number of users because, as the number of users increases, the total congestion experienced
by every user increases as well. However, it is remarkable that with the intervention scheme the
manager can completely fill the gap between the maximum efficiency utility and its expected utility
when the users are strategic but no incentive scheme is adopted (dotted line). The right side of
Fig. 6 refers to the incomplete information scenario. In this scenario the manager is guaranteed to
achieve the maximum efficiency utility using the mechanism derived from the algorithm (dashed
line) if the number of users is sufficiently small. In fact, for a number of users less than or
equal to 3, it is straightforward to check that the sufficient condition (41) is satisfied, hence, a
maximum efficiency mechanism exists and the algorithm converges to it. For a larger number
of users, there is no guarantee of optimality, and in fact the results of Fig. 4 show that in this
case the manager’s expected utility is lower than what could be obtained with compliant users.
However, the manager can still considerably increase its expected utility compared to the case of
strategic users and no incentive scheme (dotted line), by adopting the mechanism derived from
the algorithm for a number of users lower than 8 and the a priori mechanism (dash-dot line) for
a number of users greater than or equal to 8 (f defined in (??) turns out to sustain the solution of
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(43) without intervention in Γ). It is not surprising that the a priori mechanism is able to obtain
good performance for a high number of users, in fact in this situation the manager is able to
foresee more accurately the fraction of users of a certain type, hence the information about users’
types becomes less important.
Now we investigate how the results depend on the type probability distribution for the incom-
plete information scenario. In Fig. 7 we fix the number of users to 4 and we vary the probability
of the low type, P (0.1), from 0 to 1, which is equivalent to varying P (1) from 1 to 0. We can see
that the gap between the maximum efficiency utility and the manager’s expected utility achievable
with the mechanism derived from the algorithm is not strongly dependent on the type probability
distribution. In fact, such a mechanism provides incentives for each type of user to be honest and
obedient, even though some user types occur rarely. On the contrary, the a priori mechanism is
strongly dependent on the probability distribution of user types. In fact, the recommended and
enforced action profile depends exclusively on the type probability distribution. As an example,
if the low type occurs rarely, the intervention device will suggest to the users to adopt an action
profile that is close to the objective of the users with high type, that will probably be the majority
of the users in the network. In the extreme case, if low type users are for sure not present in the
network (i.e., P(0.1) = 0), than the adopted action profile will maximize the interests of the users
having high type and the a priori mechanism is able to achieve the maximum efficiency utility.
Notice that in this situation the manager has no uncertainty about the types of the users in the
network, which is the reason why it is able to extract the maximum utility. In some sense, the
uniform probability distribution represents the worst case for the a priori mechanism because the
manager has the highest uncertainty over the types of the users in the network.
So far we have only considered the utility as performance indicator. However, the utility includes
the two real performance metrics, the throughput and the delay. Now we investigate the expected
throughput and delay achievable with the considered schemes in the complete and incomplete
information scenarios, for each type of user.19 Fig. 8 shows the expected throughput (left-side)
19Notice that all users in the network experience the same delay. However, such delay depends on the type profile: the higher
the number of high type users with respect to the number of low type users, the higher the delay. Thus, the expected delay for a
low type user is lower than the expected delay for a high type user.
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and delay (right-side) for the complete information scenario. Continuous lines refer to the high
type users, while dashed lines refer to the low type users. Notice that the high type users obtain a
higher expected throughput and a higher expected delay compared to the low type users (this will
be true also for the incomplete information scenario), confirming that the higher the type the higher
the user’s preference for throughput with respect to delay. In both pictures, the upper (continuous
and dashed) lines refer to the strategic scenario without intervention device, in which the users
adopt the NE action profile, while the overlapped lower (continuous and dashed) lines represent
the optimal action policy, obtainable with compliant users or with strategic users subject to the
intervention rule derived in Subsection V-C1. With no incentive scheme, strategic users tend to
overuse the resources of the network, transmitting with higher rates compared to the optimal ones.
This translates into much higher delays, that increase quickly as the number of users increases.
Conversely, the optimal transmission policy is such that the expected delay is almost constant with
respect to the number of users. This means that also the aggregate throughput is almost constant,
and the rate of each user scales as 1
n
.
Fig. 9 shows the expected throughput (left-side) and delay (right-side) for the incomplete
information scenario. Continuous lines refer to the high type users, while dashed lines refer
to the low type users, with the exception of the performance obtainable adopting the a priori
mechanism, represented by the dash-dot line, in which different types of users adopt the same
action and experience the same throughput and delay. In both pictures, the upper (continuous and
dashed) lines refer to the strategic scenario without intervention device, in which the users adopt
the BNE action profile, while the lower (continuous and dashed) lines represent the optimal
action policy. The performance obtainable adopting the mechanism derived from the algorithm
lies between them. The lines that represent the expected delay for the BNE action profile are
truncated for a number of users equal to 3 and 5 because the system might become unstable. In
fact, in the BNE the expected utility of a user is maximized, given that the other users adopt the
BNE. However, for some type profile instances, the utility might be equal to 0, i.e., the delay
might diverge. Thus, the expected delay diverges as well. In words, there is a positive probability
that the network becomes congested. The mechanism derived from the algorithm allows to improve
this situation, limiting the delay experienced by each user. However, such a delay increases almost
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linearly as the number of users increases. This is the reason why the a priori mechanism, at a
certain point, even though it is not able to differentiate the service given to different classes of
traffic, is able to obtain a better performance (from the manager’s utility point of view) than the
mechanism derived from the algorithm, In the a priori mechanism each user, independently of its
type, adopts a rate which is between the optimal rates adopted by the low type users and the high
type users, and this situation reflects in the expected delay. This allows to keep a very low and
constant delay with respect to the number of users.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we extend the intervention framework introduced by [17] to take into account
situations in which users hold relevant information that the manager cannot observe. To design
a system that is efficient and robust to self-interested strategic users, the manager must provide
the incentives for the users to report truthfully and to follow the recommendations. For a class
of environments that includes many resource allocation games in communication networks, we
provide conditions under which it is possible for the manager to achieve its benchmark optimum
and conditions under which it is impossible for the manager to achieve its benchmark optimum.
In both cases, we are able to characterize the optimal coordination mechanism the manager should
adopt. Although we can characterize the optimal mechanism, we also describe a suboptimal
mechanism that is easy to compute and a suboptimal mechanism that does not rely on the
communication between the users and the intervention device. Finally, we apply our framework
and results to the design of a flow control management system. Computations show that the
considered schemes can considerably improve the manager’s utility.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof:
⇒
We prove the result by contradiction.
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(
T,D, dS, π
)
is a maximum efficiency incentive compatible direct mechanism. Suppose that ∃ tˆ
such that dS(tˆ) 6= d∗(tˆ), then
argmax
dS ,pi
V0 (φ
∗, δ∗) = argmax
dS ,pi
∑
t∈T
∑
f∈F
Pt(t)π (f | t)U0
(
f, dS(t), t
)
<
< argmax
dS ,pi
∑
t∈T,t6=tˆ
∑
f∈F
Pt(t)π (f | t)U0
(
f, dS(t), t
)
+ Pt(tˆ)U0(d
∗
0, d
∗(tˆ), tˆ) ≤ V ME0 (44)
Now suppose that ∃ tˆ such that π
(
· | tˆ
)
/∈ Fd
∗(tˆ),tˆ
. If π
(
· | tˆ
)
sustains d∗(tˆ) but ∃ fˆ such that
π
(
fˆ | tˆ
)
> 0 and fˆ
(
d∗(tˆ)
)
6= d∗0, then
argmax
ds,pi
V0 (φ
∗, δ∗) = argmax
ds,pi
∑
t∈T
∑
f∈F
Pt(t)π (f | t)U0
(
f, dS, t
)
≤
≤
∑
t∈T,t6=tˆ
Pt(t)U0(d
∗
0, d
∗(t), t) + (1− π(fˆ | tˆ))U0(d
∗
0, d
∗(tˆ), tˆ) + π(fˆ | tˆ)U0(fˆ , d
S(tˆ), tˆ) <
<
∑
t∈T,t6=tˆ
Pt(t)U0(d
∗
0, d
∗(t), t) + (1− π(fˆ | tˆ))U0(d
∗
0, d
∗(tˆ), tˆ) + π(fˆ | tˆ)U0(d
∗
0, d
∗(tˆ), tˆ) = V ME0
(45)
If π
(
· | tˆ
)
does not sustain d∗(tˆ), then ∃ i and dˆi such that U i
(
d∗(tˆ), t
)
< U i
(
dˆi, d
∗
−i(tˆ), t
)
. In
this case the intervention device is not able to provide incentive to user i to adopt optimal strategy
d∗i (tˆ) when the type profile is tˆ, therefore the mechanism is not incentive compatible.
Finally, 2 is a particular case of the incentive-compatibility constraints of OICDM, therefore
it must be satisfied.
⇐
It is straightforward to verify that a mechanism satisfying 1−4 is incentive compatible and the
utility of the intervention device is equal to Eq. (12).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Proof:
Let
(
T,D, dS, π
)
be an optimal incentive compatible direct mechanism.
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Given a type profile t, we use the notations
DSi =
[
dmini , min
{
dSi (t) , d
NE0
i (t)
}]
, DS = DS1 × · · · ×D
S
n , D
S
−i = D
S \DSi
ai(t) = Ef
[
Ui
(
f, dS(t), t
)] (46)
We define the function gi(d−i) in the domain DS−i as follows:
gi(d−i) =
{
di ∈ D
S
i such that Ui (d∗0, d, t) = ai
} (47)
The function gi is a non-empty set-valued function from DS−i to the power set of DS−i. In fact,
∀ t ∈ T and d−i ∈ DS−i,
Ui
(
d∗0, d
min
i , d−i, t
)
= 0 ≤ ai ≤ Ui
(
d∗0, d
S
i (t), d
S
−i(t), t
)
≤ Ui
(
d∗0, d
S
i (t), d−i, t
) (48)
The second inequality of Eq. (48) is valid because i’s utility is non increasing with respect to the in-
tervention level, i.e., Ui
(
f, dS(t), t
)
≤ Ui
(
d∗0, d
S(t), t
)
, ∀ f , which implies that Ef
[
Ui
(
f, dS(t), t
)]
≤
Ui
(
d∗0, d
S(t), t
)
. The last inequality of Eq. (48) is valid because i’s utility is non increasing in the
actions of the other users and, from the definition of the set DSi , dS−i(t) ≥ d−i, ∀ d−i ∈ DSi . Eq.
(48) and the continuity of i’s utility imply that an action dˆi ∈ DSi satisfying Ui
(
d∗0, dˆi, d−i, t
)
= ai
exists, ∀d−i ∈ DS−i. Moreover, by definition gi has a closed graph (i.e., the graph of gi is a closed
subset of DS−i×DSi ) and, since i’s utility is non decreasing in
[
dmini d
NE0
i (t)
]
, gi(d−i) is convex,
∀ d−i ∈ DS−i.
We define the function g(d) = (g1(d−1), · · · , gn(d−n)), ∀ d ∈ DS. g is defined from the non-
empty, compact and convex set DS to the power set of DS. Thanks to the properties of gi, g has
a closed graph and g(d) is non-empty and convex. Therefore we can apply Kakutani fixed-point
theorem [33] to affirm that a fixed point exists, i.e., there exists an action profile dˆ ∈ DS such
that Ui
(
d∗0, dˆ, t
)
= ai, ∀ i ∈ N . For each type profile t ∈ T there exists a different fixed point,
hence, we use the notation dˆ(t). Notice that dˆ(t) < dNE0(t), therefore the intervention device is
able to sustain dˆ(t) without intervention.
Finally, the original optimal mechanism can be substituted by a mechanism where, ∀ t ∈ T ,
the intervention device suggests dˆ(t) and adopts a randomized intervention rule able to sustain
it without intervention. In the new mechanism, the users are obedient because the intervention
rule sustains dˆ(t) and they are honest because the utilities they obtain for each combination
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of reports are the same as in the original incentive compatible mechanism. The utility of the
intervention device, which depends only on the users’ utilities, is the same as in the original
mechanism. Therefore we have obtained an optimal incentive compatible direct mechanism where
the intervention device adopts a randomized intervention rule that sustains without intervention
the suggested action profile.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7
Proof:
Vi(d, ti) = Et−i [Ui(d, ti)] = di(ti)
tiEt−i [(µ− λ)] = di(ti)
ti
[(
µ− di(ti)−
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
Etj [dj(tj)]
)]
∂ lnVi(d, ti)
∂di(ti)
=
ti
di(ti)
−
1
µ− di(ti)−
∑n
j=1,j 6=iEtj [dj(tj)]
∂2 lnVi(d, ti)
∂d2i (ti)
= −
ti
d2i (ti)
−
1(
µ− di(ti)−
∑n
j=1,j 6=iEtj [dj(tj)]
)2 < 0 (49)
Imposing that the first derivative is equal to 0, we obtain that the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
dBNE must satisfy, ∀ i ∈ N and ∀ l = 1, . . . , m,
(1 + τl) d
BNE
i (τl) + τl
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
m∑
k=1
P (τk)d
BNE
j (τk) = µτl (50)
The system of equations defined by (50) can be written as a matrix equation of the form
AdBNE = b (51)
where
dBNE =


dBNE1
.
.
.
dBNEn

 , dBNEi =


dBNEi (τ1)
.
.
.
dBNEi (τm)

 , b =


bˆ
.
.
.
bˆ

 , bˆ =


µτ1
.
.
.
µτm

 , (52)
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A =


Λ τ ·P · · · τ ·P
τ ·P Λ · · · τ ·P
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
τ ·P τ ·P · · · Λ

 , (53)
Λ = diag (1 + τ1, . . . , 1 + τm) , τ =


τ1
.
.
.
τm

 , P =
[
P (τ1) . . . P (τm)
]
. (54)
We want to compute the inverse of the matrix A. We can write A as
A =


Λ− τ ·P
.
.
.
Λ− τ ·P

+


I
.
.
.
I

 ·
[
τ ·P . . . τ ·P
]
(55)
where I is the identity matrix in Rm×m.
The matrix inversion Lemma states that
(E+BCD)−1 = E−1 − E−1B
(
C
−1 +DE−1B
)−1
DE
−1 (56)
Applying the matrix inversion Lemma to A−1 we obtain
A
−1 =


Λ− τ ·P
.
.
.
Λ− τ ·P


−1
−


Λ− τ ·P
.
.
.
Λ− τ ·P


−1
·


I
.
.
.
I

 ·


I
−1 +
[
τ ·P . . . τ ·P
]
·


Λ− τ ·P
.
.
.
Λ− τ ·P


−1 
I
.
.
.
I


︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y


−1
·
[
τ ·P . . . τ ·P
]
·


Λ− τ ·P
.
.
.
Λ− τ ·P


−1
(57)
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First, we calculate
(Λ− τ ·P)−1 = Λ−1 −Λ−1 · τ ·
(
−1 +P ·Λ−1 · τ
)−1
·P ·Λ−1
= Λ−1 −Λ−1 · τ ·
1
−1 +
∑m
i=1 P (τi)
τi
1+τi
·P ·Λ−1
= Λ−1 −Λ−1 · τ · β ·P ·Λ−1 (58)
where β = 1
−1+
∑m
i=1 P (τi)
τi
1+τi
.
Now we calculate Y−1. We rewrite Y as
Y = I+
[
τ ·P . . . τ ·P
]
·


Λ− τ ·P
.
.
.
Λ− τ ·P


−1 
I
.
.
.
I


= I+
[
τ ·P . . . τ ·P
]
·


Λ
−1 − βΛ−1τPΛ−1
.
.
.
Λ
−1 − βΛ−1τPΛ−1

 ·


I
.
.
.
I


= I+ n · τ ·P ·
(
Λ
−1 − βΛ−1τPΛ−1
)
= I+ τ ·
[
n ·
(
1−PΛ−1τβ
)]
·PΛ−1
= I+ τ ·
n
1−
∑m
i=1 P (τi)
τi
1+τi
·PΛ−1 (59)
Applying the matrix inversion Lemma to Y−1 we obtain
Y
−1 = I−1 − I−1τ ·
(
1−
∑m
i=1 P (τi)
τi
1+τi
n
+P ·Λ−1 · I−1 · τ
)−1
·P ·Λ−1 · I−1
= I− τ ·

 1
1−
∑m
i=1 P (τi)
τi
1+τi
n
+
∑m
i=1 P (τi)
τi
1+τi

 ·P ·Λ−1
= I−
n
1 + (n− 1)
∑m
i=1 P (τi)
τi
1+τi
· τPΛ−1 (60)
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Finally, we can calculate A−1 as
A
−1 =


Λ− τ ·P
.
.
.
Λ− τ ·P


−1
−


Λ− τ ·P
.
.
.
Λ− τ ·P


−1
·


I
.
.
.
I

 ·
=
(
I−
n
1 + (n− 1)
∑m
i=1 P (τi)
τi
1+τi
· τPΛ−1
)
·
[
τ ·P . . . τ ·P
]
·


Λ− τ ·P
.
.
.
Λ− τ ·P


−1
=


B
.
.
.
B

−


C . . . C
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
C . . . C

 (61)
where
B = Λ−1 − βΛ−1τPΛ−1
C =
(
Λ
−1 − βΛ−1τPΛ−1
)
·
(
I−
n
1 + (n− 1)
∑m
i=1 P (τi)
τi
1+τi
· τPΛ−1
)
· τP ·
(
Λ
−1 − βΛ−1τPΛ−1
)
Hence, the BNE can be analytically computed:
dBNE = A−1b (62)
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 8
Proof:
We study the sign of the derivative of i’s utility with respect to i’ action
∂ lnUi(f, di, d˜−i, t)
∂di
=


ti
di
−
1
µ−
∑
k 6=i d˜k − di
di < d˜i
ti
di
−
1 + ci
µ−
∑
k 6=i d˜k − di − ci(di − d˜i)
d˜i < di < d˜i +
dM0
ci
ti
di
−
1
µ−
∑
k 6=i d˜k − di − d
M
0
di > d˜i +
dM0
ci
We denote by dBRi (d−i) the best response function of user i, i.e., i’s action that maximizes
i’s utility when the action vector of the other users is d−i. Since the users’ utilities satisfy the
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assumptions A4-A6, ∂Ui(f, di, d˜−i, t)
∂di
≥ 0 for di < d˜i. In fact Ui(f, d, ti) is increasing with respect
to di in
[
0, dBRi (d˜−i)
)
and d˜i ≤ dNE
0
i = d
BR
i (d
NE0
−i ) ≤ d
BR
i (d˜−i), where the first inequality is
an hypothesis of the Lemma and the last inequality is valid because of the submodularity of the
game.
Imposing the condition ∂Ui(f, di, d˜−i, t)
∂di
≤ 0 in d˜i < di < d˜i +
dM0
ci
, we find
ci ≥
ti
(
µ−
∑n
k=1,k 6=i d˜k − di
)
− di
ti
(
di − d˜i
)
+ di
(63)
The right hand side term of 63 is decreasing in di, therefore the condition is valid in d˜i < di <
d˜i +
dM0
ci
if and only if it is valid in d˜i, obtaining
ci ≥
ti
(
µ−
∑n
k=1 d˜k
)
− d˜i
d˜i
(64)
Notice that the condition on ci is a necessary condition for d˜i to be a NE. In fact if it is not
satisfied then Ui(f, di, d˜−i, t) is strictly increasing in d˜i and, for the continuity of Ui(f, di, d˜−i, t)
with respect to di, we can find an action dˆi > d˜i such that Ui(f, dˆi, d˜−i, t) > Ui(f, d˜i, d˜−i, t).
Finally, imposing the condition ∂Ui(f, di, d˜−i, t)
∂di
≤ 0 in di > d˜i +
dM0
ci
, we find
dM0 ≥
ci
[
ti
(
µ−
∑n
k=1 d˜k
)
− d˜i
]
1 + ti(1 + ci)
(65)
Notice that, given the condition on ci, this last condition is sufficient for d˜i to be a global
maximizer. In fact in this way Ui(f, di, d˜−i, t) becomes quasi-concave in di: increasing for di < d˜i
and decreasing for di > d˜i.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 11
Proof:
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Condition 1, 3 and 4 of 1 are satisfied (we implicitly assume that dM0 ≥
µ
1 + τ1
). It remains to
verify that 2 is satisfied, i.e., ∀τi, τˆi ∈ Ti,∑
t−i∈T−i
P (t−i)d
τi
i
(
µ−
n∑
k=1
dk
)
≥
∑
t−i∈T−i
P (t−i)dˆ
τi
i
(
µ−
n∑
k=1
dˆk
)
(66)
where, ∀j 6= i,
di =
τiµ
n+
∑
k 6=i tk + τi
, dj =
tjµ
n+
∑
k 6=i tk + τi
, dˆi =
τˆiµ
n+
∑
k 6=i tk + τˆi
, dˆj =
tjµ
n+
∑
k 6=i tk + τˆi
(67)
In particular, Eq. (66) is valid if, ∀t−i ∈ T−i,
dτii
(
µ−
n∑
k=1
dk
)
≥ dˆτii
(
µ−
n∑
k=1
dˆk
)
(68)
Substituting Eq. (67) into Eq. (68) we obtain:(
n +
∑
k 6=i tk + τˆi
n +
∑
k 6=i tk + τi
)τi+1(
τi
τˆi
)τi
≥ 1 (69)
We use the notation a = n +
∑
k 6=i tk, and x =
τˆi
τi
. We want to find the condition on τi and x
such that
f(x) =
(
a+ τix
a+ τi
)τi+1
x−τi ≥ 1 (70)
Notice that f(1) = 1. We take the derivative of f with respect to x
f ′(x) = (τi + 1)
(
a+ τix
a+ τi
)τi+1 τi
a+ τi
x−τi −
(
a+ τix
a+ τi
)τi+1
τix
−τi−1 = τix
−τi−1
(
a+ τix
a+ τi
)τi ( x− a
a + τi
)
(71)
f ′(x) ≥ 0⇔ x ≥ a⇔ τˆi
τi
≥ n +
∑
k 6=i tk.
f( τˆi
τi
) is decreasing in τˆi until τˆi = τi
(
n+
∑
k 6=i tk
)
, then it is increasing. This implies that
for τˆi < τi Eq. (68) is satisfied, i.e., user i has no incentive to report a lower type. However, if
τˆi → τ
+
i , since f ′(1) < 0, then user i ha an incentive to communicate a higher type (this result
is linked to 2). In fact Eq. (68) is unsatisfied ∀t−i ∈ T−i, and therefore Eq. (67) is unsatisfied.
Since the function f( τˆi
τi
) increases for τˆi > τi
(
n+
∑
k 6=i tk
)
, the only way for Eq. (68) to be
satisfied is that the function f(x) will eventually reach the value 1 for a value xth = τ th
τi
and all
the types higher than τi are higher than the threshold value τ th. Notice that it is sufficient that
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this condition is verified by the type that follows τi, i.e., τi+1. Substituting τˆi with τi+1 into Eq.
(69) we obtain Eq. (41).
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 12
Proof:
First, we demonstrate that Eq. (43) describes a convex problem if τm ≤ n. The constraints
describe a convex set. We can rewrite the objective function in the following way
f(d) = − ln
[(
µ−
n∑
i=1
di
)∑
t∈T
Pt(t)
n∏
i=1
d
ti
n
i
]
= − ln
[(
µ−
n∑
i=1
di
)
n∏
i=1
m∑
l=1
P (τl)d
τl
n
i
]
=
= − ln
(
µ−
n∑
i=1
di
)
−
n∑
i=1
ln
m∑
l=1
P (τl)d
τl
n
i (72)
We calculate the partial derivatives of f(d)
∂f(d)
∂dj
=
1
µ−
∑n
i=1 di
−
∑m
l=1 P (τl)
τl
n
d
τl
n
−1
i∑m
l=1 P (τl)d
τl
n
i
∂2f(d)
∂d2j
=
1
(µ−
∑n
i=1 di)
2 −
(∑m
l=1 P (τl)
τl
n
(
τl
n
− 1
)
d
τl
n
−2
i
)(∑m
l=1 P (τl)d
τl
n
i
)
−
(∑m
l=1 P (τl)
τl
n
d
τl
n
−1
i
)2
(∑m
l=1 P (τl)d
τl
n
i
)2
∂2f(d)
∂dj∂dk
=
1
(µ−
∑n
i=1 di)
2 (73)
We have ∂
2f(d)
∂d2j
≥
∂2f(d)
∂dj∂dk
≥ 0, where the first inequality is valid if τm ≤ n.
Before concluding, we state and prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 13. The matrix
H =


α1 β . . . β
β α2 . . . β
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
β β . . . αn

 (74)
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where αi ≥ β ≥ 0, ∀i = {1, 2, · · · , n}, is positive semidefinite. If the first inequality is strict, it is
also positive definite.
Proof:
H = β


1 1 . . . 1
1 1 . . . 1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 1 . . . 1

+


α1 − β 0 . . . 0
0 α2 − β . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 . . . αn − β

 (75)
Therefore
vT ·H · v = (α1 − β) v
2
1 + · · ·+ (αn − β) v
2
n + β
(
n∑
i=1
vi
)2
(76)
vT ·H · v ≥ 0 ∀ v if αi ≥ β ≥ 0 ∀ i. vT ·H · v > 0 ∀ v 6= 0 if αi > β ≥ 0 ∀ i.
Applying Lemma 13 to the Hessian of the function f(d) we obtain that the Hessian is positive
semidefinite, therefore the function f(d) is convex.
As for the optimality of the a priori incentive compatible mechanism
(
T,D, d, π
)
, for every a
priori incentive compatible mechanism we have
maxpi,dV0(d) = maxpi,dEt

Ef

 n
√√√√ n∏
i=1
U+i (f, d, t)



 ≤ maxdEt

 n
√√√√ n∏
i=1
U+i (d
∗
0, d, t)

 =
= max
d
(
µ−
n∑
i=1
di
)+
Et

 n
√√√√ n∏
i=1
dtii

 = max
d
(
µ−
n∑
i=1
di
)
Et
[
n∏
i=1
d
ti
n
i
]
(77)
Thus if a randomized intervention rule π sustains without intervention d, the mechanism
(
T,D, d, π
)
is an optimal a priori incentive compatible direct mechanism.
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Fig. 1. Interaction between the users and the intervention device
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Fig. 2. User i’s utility vs. user i’s action, for different suggested actions
Fig. 3. Representation of a flow control application as a M/M/1 queue
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Fig. 4. Manager’s utility as a function of the number of users
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Fig. 5. User i’s utility as a function of user i’s action for different intervention rules
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Fig. 6. Manager’s expected utility vs. number of users for the complete and incomplete information scenarios
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Fig. 7. Manager’s expected utility vs. low type probability for the incomplete information scenario
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Fig. 8. Total expected throughput and delay vs. number of users for the complete information scenarios
2 4 6 8 10
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Number of users
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 fo
r u
se
r
µ = 5 , Ti = [ 0.1 1]
 
 
Optimal, t1 = 0.1
Optimal, t1 = 1
Algorithm, t1 = 0.1
Algorithm, t1 = 1
A priori mechanism
BNE, t1 = 0.1
BNE, t1 = 1
2 4 6 8 10
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
Number of users
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 d
el
ay
 fo
r u
se
r
 
 
Fig. 9. Expected throughput and delay for user vs. number of users for the incomplete information scenarios
